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Abstract
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable
that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is
stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration
monotonicity, which requires that every agent becomes better off after any
number of matching markets merge. Integration monotonicity is also incom-
patible with the weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality.
Nevertheless, I obtain two possibility results. First, stable matching
mechanisms never hurt more than one half of the society after the inte-
gration of several matching markets occurs. Second, in random matching
markets there are positive expected gains from integration for both sides of
the market, which I quantify.
Keywords: social integration, integration monotonicity, matching schemes.
JEL Codes: C78.
Email address: ortega@zew.de
This paper is based on the third chapter of my PhD thesis. I am particularly indebted
to Herve´ Moulin for his advice and comments on previous drafts. I acknowledge helpful
comments from two anonymous referees, Christopher Chambers, Julien Combe, Bram
Driesen, Patrick Harless, Takashi Hayashi, Olivier Tercieux, Bumin Yenmez, and seminar
participants at ZEW Mannheim. I am indebted to Sarah Fox, Christina Loennblad and
Erin for proofreading the paper. Any errors are mine alone. A previous version of this
paper appeared under the title “Can everyone benefit from social integration?”.
Preprint resubmitted to the Journal of Mathematical Economics July 24, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
08
03
3v
5 
 [q
-fi
n.E
C]
  2
3 J
ul 
20
18
1. Introduction
The (stable) marriage problem (MP), proposed by Gale and Shapley
(1962), combines a rich mathematical structure with important real-life ap-
plications. The MP consists of two groups of agents, men and women. Each
man wants to marry a woman, and each woman wants to marry a man. Both
men and women have a strict preference ordering over the set of potential
spouses. The marriage terminology is a metaphor for arbitrary two-sided
matching problems, such as the assignment of workers to firms, students to
universities, doctors to hospitals, and so on.
Gale and Shapley were interested in systematic rules to decide who should
marry whom. They referred to such rules as matching mechanisms. They rec-
ognized that the outcome of a matching mechanism should be “in accordance
with agents’ preferences” and should satisfy “some agreed-upon criterion of
fairness”. Many such criteria can be formulated. Two standard criteria are
stability and Pareto optimality. I refer to these requirements as efficiency
criteria.
Other desirable criteria require that matching mechanisms incentivize
the integration of different MPs (communities) into an extended MP (the
society). I refer to these as pro-integration criteria. Matching mechanisms
that satisfy pro-integration criteria would be particularly useful in practice
because they would promote the operation of a large centralized clearing-
house instead of several small ones. For example, they would encourage
hospitals to voluntarily enrol all patient-donor pairs in multi-hospital kidney
exchange programs, instead of conducting kidney exchanges locally (Ashlagi
and Roth, 2014; Toulis and Parkes, 2015). They would also encourage char-
ter and district-run schools to collaborate in the assignment of students to
educational institutions (Manjunath and Turhan, 2016; Dog˘an and Yenmez,
2017; Ekmekci and Yenmez, 2018). Furthermore, they could ease the merger
of school districts, which is an ongoing process in the US, given that 80%
of racial and ethnic segregation in its public schools occur between, but not
within, school districts (Clotfelter, 2004; Hafalir and Yenmez, 2017).
In all the aforementioned cases, hospitals, schools, and school districts
could increase the efficiency of their matching procedures by working to-
gether. Hospitals could increase the total number of successful kidney ex-
changes by using a multi-hospital clearinghouse, whereas schools and school
districts could fill more seats using a centralized admission process that,
at the same time, makes the final allocation of students to schools more
diverse. Nevertheless, the aforementioned literature has documented that
institutions are reluctant to participate in large centralized clearinghouses,
partly because they anticipate that their new allocations after integration
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occurs will be worse than those they might obtain by matching within their
own community only.
My first goal in this paper is to determine which efficiency criteria are
compatible with pro-integration requirements. For this purpose, I define two
intuitive pro-integration criteria. The first is weak integration monotonicity
(WIM). It requires that, whenever all disjoint communities merge as one,
every agent weakly prefers the outcome obtained in an integrated society
to the one obtained in a segregated one. For example, given a society with
three communities A, B, and D, WIM requires that the matching obtained
in society A∪B∪D is weakly preferred by every agent to the one obtained in
each community A, B, or D alone. It is natural to expect that all communi-
ties will agree to integrate as a unified society whenever they use a matching
mechanism that is WIM.
Although WIM is a very intuitive pro-integration criterion, whether it is
satisfied or not crucially depends on how we define the communities. Even
though WIM may be satisfied for a society with communities A, B, and
D, it may be violated when the communities become {A ∪ B} and D. If
WIM is not satisfied in this latter case, should we expect the whole society
to integrate, or should only communities A and B merge? Our second pro-
integration property guarantees that integration occurs for every combination
of communities. I call this property integration monotonicity (IM). It ensures
that complete social integration will always take place in a society, no matter
the order in which the communities merge.
In the previous example with three communities, IM requires that the
matching obtained in societies A ∪ B, A ∪ D, and B ∪ D is weakly pre-
ferred by every agent to the one obtained in each society A, B, or D alone.
Furthermore, it also requires that the matching obtained in the completely
integrated society A ∪ B ∪ D is weakly preferred by everybody to that ob-
tained in societies A∪B, A∪D, and B ∪D. Although IM is a stronger and
less intuitive property than WIM, it is desirable because it guarantees that
once full integration has been achieved, no subset of communities will want
to separate from the rest and match only within themselves.1 In other words,
whenever IM is violated, we can re-arrange the communities in a society so
that WIM is also violated.
Stability is incompatible even with WIM (Proposition 1). This is not
surprising given the well-known result establishing that adding a man to an
1Niederle and Roth (2003) document this phenomenon in the matching of American
gastroenterologists to hospitals. Even though local matching markets managed to merge
into a centralized clearinghouse in 1986, some hospitals started defecting in 1994, until
the centralized clearinghouse was completely abandoned in 2000.
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MP makes every existing man weakly worse off. However, it is interesting
that stable matching mechanisms never harm more than half of the society
after the integration of communities occurs (Proposition 2). This upper
bound is tight, yet simulation results with random preferences suggest that
the expected fraction of agents hurt by integration is considerably smaller,
in fact consistently around one quarter of the society. It is also interesting
that the much weaker efficiency property of Pareto optimality is incompatible
with IM (Proposition 3).
My second goal in this paper is to quantify the expected gains or losses
from integration under stable matching mechanisms. I measure these welfare
changes as the difference in the ranking of agents’ spouses before and after
integration occurs. For example, if I obtained my 5th best possible partner
after integration occurred, but before this I obtained my 2nd best possible
partner, there is a difference here of 3 positions, which shows that there
are losses from integration. Societies may achieve social integration if the
welfare losses, if any, are small compared to the size of the society, even in
the absence of stable and pro-integration matching mechanisms.
I find that in large MPs, both men and women benefit from integration
when agents’ preferences over all potential spouses are drawn independently
and uniformly at random (a random MP). In a random MP with κ communi-
ties, each with n men and n women, the expected gains from integration for
men and women under the men-optimal stable matching are asymptotically
equivalent to log(nκ−1/κ) and κn
(
1
logn
− 1
log κn
)
, respectively. These expres-
sions are derived in Proposition 4 and are good approximations even for MPs
with only a few agents and communities. These approximations show that
women particularly benefit from integration when the men-optimal stable
matching is selected before and after integration occurs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 establishes the compatibility between
efficiency and pro-integration properties. Section 5 discusses the expected
gains from integration. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
This paper contributes to a recent body of literature studying the chal-
lenges of integration in different types of matching markets. Manjunath and
Turhan (2016), Dog˘an and Yenmez (2017) and Ekmekci and Yenmez (2018)
study the integration of different school admission processes. In their models,
the set of students in two different communities is the same, i.e. communities
are not disjoint. This implies that some students may receive two school of-
fers, while some may get none. To ensure that all students receive at least one
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offer, Manjunath and Turhan (2016) propose iteratively rematching students
to schools. Although rematching may be costly, they show that a few itera-
tions yield large welfare gains. Using a similar approach, Dog˘an and Yenmez
(2017) show that students are weakly better off when all schools join a cen-
tralized clearinghouse. The previous two papers take as given that schools
will merge their admission policies, and thus do not analyze the schools’
incentives to integrate.
In contrast, Ekmekci and Yenmez (2018) focus on the incentives of each
school in joining a centralized clearinghouse. In their paper, a school has
incentives to integrate if it gets better students participating in a centralized
clearinghouse rather than running its own admission policy after all other
schools have joined the aforementioned centralized clearinghouse. Using this
sequential notion of integration, they obtain results similar to mine: no school
has incentives to integrate. They consider restrictions on agents’ preferences
and particular policies that can make integration easier to achieve.
Hafalir and Yenmez (2017) use the slightly different framework of match-
ing with contracts to study the integration of school districts. A district is
similar to a community in that it contains schools and students and in that
all districts are disjoint. They show that if the choice functions of school
districts respect initial endowments or a property they call favoristic, then
integration under stable matching mechanisms does not harm a single stu-
dent. Although this paper is close in spirit to theirs, they have different
objectives. Their paper focuses on identifying conditions on schools’ choice
functions that guarantee that integration occurs, whereas this paper ana-
lyzes instead how integration can be achieved by computing the expected
gains from integration in a random matching market.
In the different context of kidney exchange, Ashlagi and Roth (2014) use
a one-sided matching framework to study the incentives of hospitals to fully
reveal their patient-donor pairs to a centralized clearinghouse. They call a
matching mechanism individually rational for a hospital if it always matches
more agents of that hospital after integration occurs. They show that in
one-sided matching problems, there is no efficient matching mechanism that
is maximal in the number of matchings created and, at the same time, is in-
dividually rational for every community. They and Toulis and Parkes (2015)
study mechanisms that are individually rational for multi-hospital kidney
exchange, and show that in a large market, their proposed mechanism is
asymptotically individually rational.
All the aforementioned results are inspired by the well-known monotonic-
ity result which establishes that whenever a woman is added to a MP, every
man becomes weakly better off. Similarly, adding an extra woman makes
every existing woman weakly worse off. This result extends to many-to-
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one MPs (Theorem 5 in Kelso and Crawford, 1982, Theorems 1 and 2 in
Crawford, 1991, and Theorems 2.25 and 2.26 in Roth and Sotomayor, 1992).
Ashlagi et al. (2017) describe the exact magnitude of these welfare changes
in random MPs. Toda (2006) uses this monotonicity property to characterize
the set of stable outcomes.
Related notions of integration monotonicity have been explored in co-
operative game theory. In particular, Sprumont (1990) defines population
monotonicity, a more general property that allows groups of arbitrary size to
integrate. It requires that whenever two communities of arbitrary size join
as one, there exists a way of sharing the surplus generated by its members
so that every agent becomes weakly better off. He provides a characteriza-
tion of population monotonicity using monotonic games with veto players.
Sprumont’s work only applies to games with transferable utility. This large
class of games does not include the MP. My notion of matching schemes is
inspired by his notion of assignment schemes.
More recently, Chambers and Hayashi (2017) use the population mono-
tonicity axiom (which they call integration monotonicity) to study exchange
economies. The definition of integration monotonicity that I use corresponds
to theirs. They find that an allocation rule satisfies Pareto optimality and
integration monotonicity only if the order in which communities integrate
matters. Interestingly, they show that whenever integration occurs, it must
hurt at least a third of the society if equals are treated equally.
The term population monotonicity is sometimes used to refer to the sol-
idarity axiom, introduced by Thomson (1983). This axiom is suitable for
scenarios in which a society produces a fixed amount of welfare, no matter
how many agents belong to it. Examples of those include bargaining and
fair division. The solidarity axiom requires that the burden imposed by a
new agent should be shared by all existing members of a society. Popula-
tion monotonicity and solidarity are similar concepts but have very different
interpretations.
3. Model
A community C is a set of men and women, and contains at least one
person of each gender. There are κ disjoint communities. Given a set of
communities, the society S is the set of all communities. A population P ⊆ S
is a set of communities in S. MP and W P denote the sets of men and women
in each community C ∈ P . Cx denotes the community to which person x
belongs. As it will cause no confusion, I will use the notation x ∈ P whenever
∃C ∈ P such that x ∈ C, i.e. whenever a person x belongs to a community
in population P .
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Each man m (resp. woman w) has strict preferences over the set of all
women in the society W S (resp. men MS).2 I write w m w′ to denote
that m prefers w to w′. Similarly, w <m w′ if either w m w′ or w = w′. I
represent women’s preferences using the same notation. Given a population
P , I call P := (x)x∈(MP∪WP ) a preference profile of the agents belonging to
the communities in P . An extended MP is a triple (MS,W S;S).
Given a population P , a matching µ : (W P ∪MP ) 7→ (W P ∪MP ) is a
function of order two (µ2(x) = x) such that if µ(m) 6= m, then µ(m) ∈ W P ,
and if µ(w) 6= w, then w ∈ MP . An agent is matched to himself if he
remains unmatched. A matching scheme σ : (MS ∪W S)× 2S 7→ (MS ∪W S)
is a function that specifies a matching σ(·, P ) for every P ∈ 2S, i.e. σ(·, P ) :
(MP ∪W P ) 7→ (MP ∪W P ). A matching mechanism Γ is a function 7→ Γ()
from the set of all preference profiles to the set of all matching schemes.
To give an example of an extended MP and a matching scheme, consider a
society with two communities, A and B, each with one man and one woman.
Agents’ preferences are such that the man from community A (mA) prefers
the woman from community A (wA) over the woman from community B
(wB). The preferences of the remaining agents are summarized below
wA mA wB mB wA mA
wA mB wB mB wB mA
A possible matching scheme σ is σ(mA, A) = wA, σ(mB, B) = wB, σ(mA, S) =
wB and σ(mB, S) = wA. We will return to this example in Proposition 1.
3.1. Efficient Matching Schemes
I consider two well-known efficiency properties. The first is stability.
Besides its intuitive appeal, the concept of stability is a good predictor of
the success of several real-life matching mechanisms (Roth and Sotomayor,
1992).
Definition 1 (Stability). A matching µ : (W P ∪ MP ) 7→ (W P ∪ MP ) is
stable if there is no man m ∈ MP and no woman w ∈ W P that are not
married to each other (µ(m) 6= w) such that w m µ(m) and m w µ(w).
Any such pair (m,w) is called a blocking pair.
A weaker efficiency property is Pareto optimality. It is arguably the most
basic efficiency consideration in economics. It only requires that there is no
way of making one agent better off without hurting any other agent.
2For simplicity, I assume that each man (resp. woman) prefers matching with any
woman (resp. man) rather than remaining alone.
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Definition 2 (Pareto optimality). A matching µ : (W P∪MP ) 7→ (W P∪MP )
is Pareto optimal if there is no other matching µ′ such that µ′(x) <x µ(x)
for every agent x ∈ (W P ∪ MP ), and µ′(y) y µ(y) for some agent y ∈
(W P ∪MP ).
The properties of matchings trivially extend to matching schemes and
mechanisms. A matching scheme σ is stable (resp. Pareto optimal) if the
matching σ(·, P ) is stable (resp. Pareto optimal) in every population P ⊆ S.
A matching mechanism Γ is stable (resp. Pareto optimal) if the matching
scheme Γ() is stable (resp. Pareto optimal) with respect to the preference
profile .
3.2. Pro-Integration Matching Schemes
I introduce two pro-integration properties. The first is weak integration
monotonicity (WIM). It requires that no agent is hurt whenever all commu-
nities integrate.
Definition 3 (Weak Integration Monotonicity). A matching scheme σ is
WIM if ∀C ∈ S and ∀x ∈ (MC ∪WC), σ(x, S) <x σ(x,Cx).
WIM matching schemes ensure that every agent is weakly better off after
communities have merged, and thus it encourages the complete integration
of disjoint communities.3
A stronger concept is integration monotonicity (IM). It requires that no
agent is hurt, whenever any two disjoint populations integrate.
Definition 4 (Integration Monotonicity). A matching scheme σ is IM if
∀P, P ′ ∈ 2S such that P ∩ P ′ = ∅ and ∀x ∈ (MP ∪W P ), σ(x, P ∪ P ′) <x
σ(x, P ).
A matching mechanism Γ is IM (resp. WIM) if the matching scheme
Γ() is IM (resp. WIM) with respect to the preference profile .
An IM matching scheme guarantees two important properties. First, that
complete social integration will occur independently of the order in which
we merge the communities (the order may affect who marries whom, but
integration always makes agents better off with respect to matching only
3WIM is stronger requirement than the individual rationality property in Ashlagi and
Roth (2014), which requires that the number of agents matched from each community
weakly increases after the integration of all communities. Individual rationality is satisfied
if all agents marry the worst possible partner after integration occurs. The number of
marriages crated after integration is (weakly) higher, but (some) agents are clearly worse
off.
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within a sub-population of the society). Second, that after the integration of
all communities has taken place, there is no subset of communities that wish
to separate from the rest of the society to match within themselves instead.
These two desiderata justify the definition of IM.
Before presenting my results, I discuss the relationship between efficiency
and pro-integration properties. One may conjecture that integration mono-
tonicity combined with Pareto optimality implies stability. This conjecture
is natural given similar existing results in the literature.4 However, this con-
jecture is false. Consider a society with two communities. One has a pretty
man and an ugly woman, whereas the other one has an ugly man and a
pretty woman. The matching scheme that always marries people to those in
their own community is integration monotonic and Pareto optimal (if ugly
people prefer pretty over ugly people). However, this matching scheme is not
stable: the pretty man and woman prefer each other to their spouses.
4. Results
It would be ideal if we could construct a stable and IM matching mecha-
nism. Unfortunately, we lack even a stable and WIM matching mechanism.
Proposition 1. For each society with at least two communities, no stable
matching mechanism is weakly integration monotonic.
Proof. Let A and B be the two communities, each with one man and one
woman. Consider the following preference profile 
wA mA wB mB wA mA
wA mB wB mB wB mA
All women prefer mB and all men prefer wA. Stability of a matching
scheme requires that σ(wA, A) = mA, σ(wB, B) = mB, and σ(wA, A ∪ B) =
mB. However, both man mA and woman wB obtain a worse partner when
communities A and B merge. Therefore, for the preference profile , any
stable matching mechanism Γ produces a matching scheme Γ() that is not
WIM.
Proposition 1 is an expected result, given the well-known result that
states that adding a man makes every woman weakly worse off, discussed
4In cooperative games with transferable utility, population monotonicity combined with
efficiency implies the core property (Sprumont, 1990). In exchange economies, integration
monotonicity combined with efficiency implies the core property (Chambers and Hayashi,
2017).
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in the Introduction. However, Proposition 2 shows that, although stable
matching mechanisms cannot guarantee that all agents are weakly better off
after integration occurs, they never harm more than one half of the agents
in the society.
Proposition 2. In any stable matching scheme σ∗,
∣∣{x ∈ (MS ∪W S) : σ∗(x,Cx) x σ∗(x, S)}∣∣ ≤ ∣∣MS ∪W S∣∣
2
The bound is tight.
Proof. Let us partition S into three sets S0, S+ and S−, defined as
S0 := {x ∈ (MS ∪W S) : σ∗(x, S) = σ∗(x,Cx)}
S+ := {x ∈ (MS ∪W S) : σ∗(x, S) x σ∗(x,Cx)}
S− := {x ∈ (MS ∪W S) : σ∗(x,Cx) x σ∗(x, S)}
so that S0 is the set of people who keep the same partner after integration,
S+ are those who prefer their “integrated” partner, and S− are those who
prefer their “segregated” partner.
Consider an arbitrary couple (x, σ∗(x,Cx)). If x ∈ S−, σ∗(x,Cx) ∈ S+
because otherwise (x, σ∗(x,Cx)) constitutes a blocking pair to the match-
ing σ∗(·, S), contradicting the fact that σ∗ is a stable matching scheme.
It follows that |S+| ≥ |S−|, and thus |S0| + |S+| ≥ |S−|. It follows that∣∣{x ∈ (MS ∪W S) : σ∗(x, S) <x σ∗(x,Cx)}∣∣ ≥ ∣∣MS ∪W S∣∣ /2, completing the
proof. The example used in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the one-half
bound is tight.
Proposition 1 shows that stability cannot be combined with pro-integration
criteria. However, Proposition 3 shows that even the considerably weaker ef-
ficiency property of Pareto optimality is also incompatible with IM.
Proposition 3. For each society with at least three communities, no Pareto
optimal matching mechanism is integration monotonic.
Proof. Let A, B and D be the three communities, each with one man and
one woman. Consider the following preference profile 
wB mA wD mA wA mB wA mD wA mA
wD mB wA mB wB mD wB mA wB mB
wA mD wB mD wD mA wD mB wD mD
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Agents’ preferences are such that agents of community A prefer those from
B, agents from B prefer those from D, and agents from D prefer to those
from A. All Pareto optimal matching schemes require σ(wA, A ∪ B) = mB,
σ(wB, B ∪ D) = mD, and σ(wD, D ∪ A) = mA. Note that in any Pareto
optimal matching scheme, there is always a community that gets its first
choice whenever we merge only two communities.
IM requires that when we aggregate all communities, all agents should
do at least as well as when only two societies merge, namely
σ(mA, S) <mA wB σ(wA, S) <wA mB
σ(mB, S) <mB wD σ(wB, S) <wB mD
σ(mD, S) <mD wA σ(wD, S) <wD mA
This is impossible, because some agent would no longer be able to obtain
her first choice.
Propositions 1 and 3 show that efficiency and pro-integration properties
are at odds with each other.5 They can only be satisfied together in their
weak versions. It is obvious that matching schemes that are Pareto optimal
and WIM always exist. We can obtain them by marrying each agent within
their own community, and then repeatedly perform Pareto improvements on
that initial matching.
Note that populations are sets of exogenously given sets of communities.
One could consider a stronger notion of integration monotonicity which re-
quires weak improvements every time two arbitrary sets of agents (which
are not sets of communities) merge. This notion is stronger than the one I
consider. Consequently, the impossibility described in Proposition 3 carries
over when using this stronger notion of integration monotonicity.
5. Gains from Integration in Stable Matching Mechanisms
In this section, I quantify the welfare changes that occur after integration
has taken place. I measure those changes by the difference in the rank of the
spouse that agents obtain before and after integration. Because this analysis
uses existing results, henceforth I will assume that each community has n
men and n women. Albeit restrictive, this assumption allows me to isolate
the effects of integration from those of having societies that are unbalanced
5IM and Pareto optimality are compatible in a society that only has two communities.
This is because, for such a society, IM and WIM are equivalent.
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in their gender ratio, which are discussed in detail by Ashlagi et al. (2017).
This assumption implies that all agents are married in any stable matching.6
I also assume throughout that the matching that occurs before and af-
ter integration is the men-optimal stable matching (MOSM). The MOSM
is a stable matching such that no man gets a better partner in any other
stable matching, and it always exists. This assumption allows me to com-
pare agents’ welfare across different stable matchings, and is also imposed
by Dog˘an and Yenmez (2017), Hafalir and Yenmez (2017) and Ekmekci and
Yenmez (2018). This assumption is justified in several applications. For
example, the student-optimal stable matching is appealing and consistently
selected in school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). Similarly, the
resident-optimal stable matching has been used to allocate medical interns
to hospitals in the U.S. (Roth and Peranson, 1999). I denote by σ∗ the
men-optimal matching scheme, so that σ∗(·, P ) is the MOSM for the match-
ing problem (MP ,W P ;P ) and σ∗(·, C) denotes the MOSM for the MP
(MCi ,WCi ,Ci), ∀Ci ∈ S.7
Now I introduce some useful definitions. Given a society, an extended
random MP is generated by drawing a complete preference list for each man
and each woman independently and uniformly at random. Random MPs were
first studied by Wilson (1972), and have been widely studied ever since. The
absolute rank of a woman w in the preference order of a manm (over all poten-
tial spouses in the society) is defined by rkm(w) :=
∣∣{w′ ∈ W S : w′ <m w}∣∣.
Similarly, I use rkw(m) to denote the absolute rank of m in the preference
order of w. Given a matching µ, the men’s absolute average rank of wives is
defined by
rkM(µ) :=
1
|MS|
∑
m∈MS
rkm(µ(m))
The same notation is used to denote the women’s average rank of hus-
bands rkW (µ). The gains from integration for men γM represent the differ-
ence between the men’s average rank of wives that they obtain before and
6I discuss the integration of unbalanced communities in Section 6.
7Formally, I should write σ∗P because the MOSM depends upon the preference profileP . Similarly, I should write below rkm(w,m) and rkM (µ,M ) to denote a man’s rank
of women and men’s average rank of wives, because they both depend on the preference
ordering m and preference profile M . However, I simplify the notation following the
literature (Ashlagi et al., 2017, p. 75), as it will be clear that these objects depend on
agents’ preferences.
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after integration occurs under the MOSM. Formally,
γM := rkM(σ
∗(·, C))− rkM(σ∗(·, S))
The same notation is used to denote women’s gains from integration γW .
A higher ranking means a less desired person and thus, there are expected
gains from integration for men and women whenever γM and γW are positive,
respectively. Proposition 4 establishes that the expected gains from integra-
tion are positive for both men and women, and provides an approximation8
for MPs in which the number of agents and communities is large.
Proposition 4. In a random extended MP with κ communities, each with n
men and n women,
E[γM ] ∼ log
(
nκ−1
κ
)
(1)
E[γW ] ∼ κn
(
1
log n
− 1
log κn
)
(2)
Proof. I start the proof with some preliminaries regarding standard MPs
with κ = 1. The McVitie and Wilson (1971) algorithm is a modification
of the deferred acceptance algorithm in which only one man proposes to a
woman at each step. Let X denote the number of proposals required by this
algorithm to find the MOSM. Using the coupon collector problem, we obtain
(see Motwani and Raghavan, 1995; p. 58)
E[X] = n log n+O(n) ∼ n log n
Because men propose first to their most preferred women, E(X)/n is the
expected men’s absolute average rank of wives, so
E[rkM(σ∗(·, S))] = log n+O(1) ∼ log n
Each woman receives log(n) proposals in expectation. The one she ac-
cepts is the one coming from her most preferred partner. The random
variable [rkW (σ
∗(·, S)) − 1] is binomially distributed with parameters (n −
8Functions f(n, κ) and g(n, κ) are asymptotically equivalent f(n, κ) ∼ g(n, κ) if
limn,κ→∞
f(n,κ)
g(n,κ) = 1.
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log n, 1
logn+1
). Therefore,
E[rkW (σ∗(·, S))] = n
log n+ 1
+O(1) ∼ n
log n
These results were proven by Wilson (1972), Knuth (1997) and Pittel
(1989),9 and are explained in detail by Canny (2001). They imply that in an
extended MP with κ communities
E[rkM(σ∗(·, S))] ∼ log κn
E[rkW (σ∗(·, S))] ∼ κn
log κn
The relative rank of a woman w in the preference order of a man m is
defined by r̂km(w) := |{w′ ∈ Cm : w′ <m w}|. It indicates the ranking of
woman w with respect to all women who belong to the same community as
m. Similarly, I denote the relative rank of m in the preference order of w
by r̂kw(m). Given a matching µ, the men’s relative average rank of wives is
defined by
r̂kM(µ) :=
1
|MS|
∑
m∈MS
r̂km(µ(m))
The same notation is used to denote the women’s relative average rank
of husbands r̂kW . Pittel’s result also implies that
E[r̂kM(σ∗(·, C))] ∼ log n
E[r̂kW (σ∗(·, C))] ∼ n
log n
So that before integration, men and women get a partner relatively ranked
∼ n and ∼ log n inside their own community. We need to figure out in which
position these partners are in the absolute ranking of all MS and W S. To
answer this question, suppose that an agent is ranked q among all agents in
his community. A random agent from another community could be better
ranked than agent 1, between agents 1 and 2, ..., between agents q − 1 and
q, between agents q and q + 1, and so on. Therefore, a random agent from
another community is in any of those gaps with probability 1/(n+1) and thus
has q/(n + 1) chances of being more highly ranked than our original agent
9Pittel (1989) proves a stronger statement, namely that rkM (σ
∗(·,S))
logn
p→ 1 and
rkW (σ
∗(·,S))
n/ logn
p→ 1.
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with the relative ranking q. There are n(κ−1) men from other communities.
On average, qn(κ−1)
n+1
men will be ranked better than him. Furthermore, there
were already q men in his own community ranked better than him. This
implies that his expected ranking is q + qn(κ−1)
n+1
= q(κn+1)
n+1
∼ qκ. Substituting
q for log(n) and n/ log(n), respectively, we obtain the expected average rank
of wives and husbands before integration. It follows that
E[γM ] = log(n)κ− log(κn) ∼ log
(
nκ−1
κ
)
E[γW ] =
n
log(n)
κ− κn
log(κn)
∼ κn
(
1
log n
− 1
log κn
)
Admittedly, we require strong assumptions to obtain Proposition 4. We
need balanced and equally populated communities, as well as independently
and uniformly distributed preferences. Although those assumptions are likely
to be violated in practice, Proposition 4 sheds some light on how the most
important stable matching mechanism (the MOSM) may promote social inte-
gration, despite its incompatibility with WIM. Not only does this matching
mechanism never hurt more than one half of society (Proposition 2), but
it also improves the expected average ranking of men’s wives and women’s
husbands after integration occurs (under the aforementioned assumptions).
Although Proposition 4 is an asymptotic result, Figure 1 shows that the
expected gains from integration for large societies described in Proposition
4 are good approximations even for small values of n and κ. Note that
women benefit more from integration. The intuition behind this observation
is that women obtain a partner who is ranked relatively very poorly before
integration occurs under the MOSM. This poor relative rank is amplified
when compared to the absolute rank in their complete preference order over
all partners.
Before concluding the paper, I describe some characteristics regarding
those agents who are hurt by integration. These observations come from
simulation exercises described in detail in the Appendix. First, the number of
women hurt by integration under the MOSM is larger than the corresponding
number of men (women 74%, men 26% with n = 500, κ = 5). Second,
the magnitude of their losses is very different. Women are severely hurt
(average loss of 303 ranking places with n = 500, κ = 5), whereas men suffer
a moderate loss at most (average loss of 8 ranking places). Women’s losses
become smaller when their preferences are correlated.
The magnitude of the losses of agents hurt by integration becomes smaller
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Figure 1: Gains from integration, by gender.
(a) r = 2 (b) r = 5
The lines denote the asymptotic expressions 1 and 2. The dots represent the average gains
from 10,000 simulations. Horizontal axis: n, vertical axis: (expected) gains from integra-
tion. Blue observations correspond to men, whereas green ones correspond to women.
compared to the size of the problem for both men and women. However, I
find it very interesting that the fraction of society hurt by integration remains
relatively constant around 25%, even when preferences are correlated.
6. Conclusion
Although it is impossible to guarantee that the integration of disjoint
matching markets will benefit everyone, the integration process never hurts
more than half of the agents if a stable matching is systematically chosen.
Furthermore, there are positive expected gains from integration in random
matching markets, which are larger for the side of the market that receives
the proposals in the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Two extensions of this paper are:
1. Many-to-one Matching. The results presented in Section 3 extend to
the many-to-one case when agents have responsive preferences. In this case,
every many-to-one problem has an equivalent formulation where, instead of
assigning students to colleges, students are assigned to college seats (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1992). Proposition 2, which establishes that no more than
half of the agents are hurt after integration occurs, is now interpreted as half
of colleges’ seats and students. In a many-to-one framework, integration can
hurt more than half of the students and colleges, even when preferences are
responsive.
It is difficult to approximate the gains from integration in many-to-one
matching problems, because the classical results from Wilson, Knuth, and
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Pittel that I use in the proof of Proposition 4 only apply to one-to-one match-
ing problems.
2. Unbalanced Societies. All results in Section 3 extend to the case of
societies that are unbalanced in their gender ratio. Regarding the expected
gains from integration, Ashlagi et al. (2017) show that the spouse rank for
men and women in the MOSM roughly reverses if there are more men than
women. Therefore, if we merge several societies, all in which there are more
men than women, the expected gains from integration roughly reverse as
well.
What happens if we merge some communities with more men than women,
and some with more women than men? It is significantly harder to com-
pute the gains from integration, which depend on the size of the gender
imbalance in each society. However, if a male-dominated community (with
more men than women) merges with a female-dominated one, men from the
male-dominated community experience larger expected gains from integra-
tion than men from the female-dominated community. Similarly, women
from the female-dominated community obtain larger gains from integration,
as compared to women from the male-dominated community.
I leave a deeper analysis of integration of many-to-one and unbalanced
matching markets for future research.
Appendix
I present the detailed simulations discussed in Section 6. In all cases,
the results presented are averages over 1,000 simulations. The numbers in
parentheses indicate standard errors. The corresponding code is available at
www.josueortega.com. The simulations were run at the High Performance
Computing facilities at the University of Glasgow. I present the simulation
results using three tables.
Table 1 describes the fraction of the society that is hurt by integration for
several combinations of parameters. The division of this group between men
and women appears in brackets, i.e. for n = 50 and κ = 2, 25.4% of society
becomes worse off after integration occurs. 40% of these 25.4% of society
are men, whereas the remaining 60% are women. I find it surprising that
the fraction of the society that gets hurt by integration remains relatively
constant around 25%. It is also interesting that in larger matching problems,
the fraction of men hurt by integration becomes smaller.
Table 2 describes the average losses experienced by those hurt by inte-
gration after all communities merge. Men suffer very moderate welfare losses
with the MOSM, whereas women who are hurt by integration suffer large
reductions in the ranking of their spouses. Interestingly, for both men and
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Table 1: Percentage of the society that prefers segregation
κ\n 50 100 500
2 25.4 [40,60] 25.8 [38,62] 25.5 [36,64]
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
3 25.4 [35,65] 25.8 [34,66] 26 [30,70]
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
4 24.8 [32,68] 25.1[29,71] 25.6 [26,74]
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
5 24.3 [28,72] 24.6 [26,74] 25.1 [26,74]
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 2: Average welfare loss experienced by people who prefer segregation, by gender.
κ\n 50 100 500
men women men women men women
2 4.9 19.7 5.7 34.9 7.4 136.6
(0.91) (9.47) (0.95) (22.91) (1.04) (246.83)
3 5.4 27.4 6.2 49.2 7.9 193.8
(1.01) (14.57) (0.96) (39.22) (0.83) (409.86)
4 5.7 35 6.5 62.1 8.1 250.8
(1.08) (21.67) (1.03) (60.48) (0.84) (623.95)
5 6 41.8 6.8 74.9 8.4 303.3
(1.07) (28.26) (1.14) (84.86) (0.88) (709.15)
women, the welfare losses divided by the size of the problem κn seem to con-
verge to zero. This observation suggests that in large markets, the welfare
losses eventually become negligible.
Finally, Table 3 computes the same variables described in Tables 1 and
2 but imposing correlation in agents’ preferences. Correlated preferences
are evident in some matching environments like school choice. I introduce
correlation in preferences as follows. I define a status quo in preferences for
both men and women. The status quo is a random order over all possible
partners. Each agent’s preferences are identical to the status quo, except
perhaps in at most c positions. For example, if c = 2 and the status quo
over six partners is 1  2  3  4  5  6, an agent’s preferences could be
1  2  6  4  5  3 but not 2  3  1  4  5  6. The swaps in
agents’ preferences are chosen randomly. The expected correlation coefficient
between each agents’ preferences and the status quo equals ρ = 1− c
κn
. The
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Table 3: Statistics for correlated preferences, n = 100, κ = 2.
ρ Fraction Exp. ranking Welfare loss
worse off men women men women
(1) (2) (3)
0.9 24.6 105.6 93.9 30.5 31.9
(0.02) (59.22) (50.78) (17.75) (24.36)
0.7 26.1 114.3 89.2 17.2 34.7
(0.02) (25.51) (20.07) (8.45) (25.87)
0.5 26.1 109.7 93.4 10.9 34.8
(0.02) (15.81) (11.85) (3.46) (22.99)
0.3 25.9 104.4 97.5 7.8 34.1
(0.02) (6.46) (4.43) (1.83) (21.68)
0.1 25.8 101.1 100.1 6.1 34.1
(0.02) (1.05) (0.62) (1.24) (22.35)
0 25.8 100.6 100.5 5.7 34.9
(0.02) (0.22) (0.1) (0.95) (22.91)
simulation results using correlated preferences appear in Table 3.10
I find that the fraction of people against integration still remains around
25% (column 1). Moreover, the expected ranking of women hurt by inte-
gration increases, whereas that of men decreases (column 2). This finding
suggests that the proposer’s advantage becomes larger with correlated pref-
erences. This advantage achieves its peak with ρ = 0.7, but declines when
the preferences become more correlated. This is due to the fact that the
size of the set of stable matching collapses when the preferences are highly
correlated (Holzman and Samet, 2014).11 For the same reason, men’s wel-
fare losses become larger and comparable to those suffered by women as ρ
increases (column 3).
10There are several ways of introducing correlation in preferences, e.g. Caldarelli and
Capocci (2001), Boudreau and Knoblauch (2010), Hafalir et al. (2013), Lee (2017), and
Che and Tercieux (2018).
11The set of stable matchings even becomes a singleton for a variety of highly correlated
preferences (Eeckhout, 2000; Clark, 2006; Ortega and Hergovich, 2017).
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